

REMARKS

On a Late PAMPHLET,

Intituled,

*A Treatise on the Improvements made
in the ART of CRITICISM.*

*Break one Cob-web thro',
He spins the slight, self-pleasing Thread anew.
Destroy his Fib, or Sophistry : in vain ;
The Creature's at his dirty Work again.*



L O N D O N,

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*A Treatise on the Improvements made
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IN the following Sheets I propose to make a few Remarks on the Pamphlet mentioned in the Title Page : Without taking any Notice of what is merely personal, I shall confine myself to the little of Argument and Reasoning, which occurs in it ; and there does indeed occur so little of this Kind, that any Examination will probably be deemed unnecessary. However, as it is declared to be the last Effort of an expiring Cause, mere Charity seems to require, that it should not be intirely overlooked.

I.

" We may be sure, says Mr. J. that *Plato* " delivers his real inward Sentiments in his " Letters to his Friends ^a." In Answer to this, a Passage was produced from one of these very Letters, in which *Plato* declares

^a *Farther Defence*, p. 38.

A

that

that he sometimes conveys Doctrines in these Pieces that do but little correspond with the real Sentiments of his own Mind^b.

The single Point in dispute^c is, whether all that *Plato* delivers in his Epistles, must be considered as his real Opinion. And what does Mr. J. reply to the Testimony last cited? He insists that the Letter from which it is taken, is *an arrant Forgery*. And how does he shew this? Why, “the learned *Ficinus* calls those *Ignoramus*’s, who think it “genuine^d.” But does not then our^e experienced old *Critic*^f know that *Eusebius* and *Theodorit*^g cite this Epistle, and suppose that it was really written by *Plato*? And does not he himself contend that the Ancients were abler and far more unexceptionable Judges with regard to the Authenticity of ancient Books, than any Moderns can be? How, therefore, can he raise and advance the Authority of *Ficinus* above that of these Ancients, without contradicting his own Principles? I am here urging a mere Argument *ad hominem*, and not endeavouring to prove,

^b *Critical Inquiry*, Ed. 2. p. 144, 145.

^c I do not propose to say any thing as to *Plato*’s Belief of a Future State, since, as has been already observed, Mr. J. mistakes the very Point in Question.

^d *Treatise on the Improvements*, p. 37.

^e *Treatise on Improvements*, &c. p. 35. Mr. J. is an experienced old Critic. — A learned Critic, according to the Rules of Aristotle. P. 1.

^f *Præp. Evang.* l. xi. c. 13. ^g *Theod. Affect.* p. 27.

on the Authority of these Writers, that the Letter is really genuine.

However, I must do him the Justice to observe, that he is not singular in this Opinion; the late Mr. Collins, in his *Discourse of Free-thinking*, did indeed advance the very same thing. But then he received so severe and proper a Rebuke on the Occasion from *Phileleutherus Lipsiensis*, that I did not imagine any one would have been hardy enough to second him in this Assertion. It was remarked by *Cudworth*, that the Credit of this Epistle had been called in Question, "that a Mark of Bastardy was prefixed to it in all the Editions of *Plato's Works*." Upon this Dr. *Bentley* declares, "That is true indeed of the *Brand*, but he was a bold ignorant that put it there. That Letter is as genuine as any of the rest; and was received in the List before the Christian Name began^h. *Laertius*, an Epicurean, who lived in *Antoninus Pius's* Time, gives a Catalogue of them all; Επιστολαι τετραδεκα, says he, Epistles thirteen; (and so *Suidas* in Λπργίτεω) but take this branded one away, and there are but twelve. Among these are πρὸς Διονύσιον τέτραπες, four, says he, to *Dionysius*; remove this suspected one, and there remain

^h It was objected, that this Letter was forged by some zealous Christian, in order to give the Heathens a more favourable Notion of Revelation.

" but *three*. In a word, all the present
" thirteen answer exactly to his Listⁱ ." &c.

There is, I think, great Force in the two following Observations. 1. *Laertius* assures us, that there are *thirteen* Epistles; take away this branded one, and there are only *twelve*. 2. *Laertius* says, there are *four* to *Dionysius*; remove this suspected one, and there are but *three*. What now says Mr. J. to these Reflexions of the learned *Bentley*? " *Plato* indeed wrote no more than *twelve* Letters, as appears from the particular numbering of them by *Laertius*; and therefore he wrote *twelve* ($\deltaώδεκα$) and not *thirteen*, ($\tauρισκαιδεκα$) as his Text has it^k." The Point is, whether we are to look for *twelve* or *thirteen* of these Letters. And here let me ask, 1. If there are only *twelve*, how shall we find out *four* to *Dionysius*; or which way will it be possible to reconcile *Laertius* to himself with respect to this Particular? 2. Upon what Grounds does the Gentleman affirm that *Laertius* reckons up only *twelve* Letters? He actually and expressly mentions *thirteen*. " There is, says he, one to *Aristodemus*; two to *Archytas*, four to *Dionysius*; one to *Hermias*, and *Eraerus* and *Coriscus*; one to *Leodamas*; one to *Dion*; one to *Perdiccas*;

ⁱ Remarks upon a Discourse of Free-thinking, P. ii. p. 39.

^k Treatise, &c. p. 37, 38.

" two to Dion's Friends !."

Besides, those who affirm the Letter to be spurious, suppose it was forged by some *Christian*, in order to recommend and promote his Religion among the *Pagans*. But is it credible that he would have put Idolatry into a Work, composed with such a View ?

Did not *Thrasyllus* and *Aristophanes Grammaticus* give the very same List with *Laertius*? And yet the first of these Writers lived in the Time of *Augustus*, and the other 200 Years before the Coming of our *Saviour*^m.

^l Πρὸς Ἀγριόδηνον, μία. τρεῖς Ἀρχυταῖ, δύο. τρεῖς Διονίσιον τεττάγες. τρεῖς Εφεσίαν, καὶ Ἐραστον, καὶ Κορίσκον, μία. τρεῖς Λεωδαμανταῖ, μία. τρεῖς Διωναῖ, μία. τρεῖς Περδίκκαν, τρεῖς τοὺς Διωνοῦντες, δύο. l. iii. 61. Menag. Ed. p. 200, 201. una est ad Aristodemum, ad Archytam duæ, ad Dionysium quatuor, ad Hermiam, & Eraustum, & Coriscum, una; ad Leodamantem, una, ad Dionem una, ad Perdiccam una; ad Dionis necessarios duæ.—Fabricius too says, Platonis Philosophi Epistolæ XIII. Bibl. Gr. Vol. I. p. 418. Again, Epistolæ XIII. prima secunda & tertia scripta est ad Dionysium, quarta ad Dionem Syracusanum, quinta ad Perdiccam, sexta ad Hermiam, Eraustum & Coriscum, septima & octava ad Dionis amicos, nona ad Archytam Tarentinum, decima ad Aristodorum, undecima ad Leodamantem, duodecima iterum ad Archytam, tertia decima ad Dionysium. L. III. Vol. II. p. 27. What then could lead Mr. J. to assert, that *Laertius* reckons up but twelve Letters? Did he imagine that the Latin Translation in the last Part is more full, and goes beyond the Original? Or, in other Words, that only two Letters were addressed to *Perdiccas*, and *Dion's Friends*? Had he looked into *Plato*, he might have seen that the fifth was written to *Perdiccas*, and the seventh and eighth to *Dion's Friends*. Edit. Ficin.

^m " If we look into the internal Character of the Letter itself, it will have all the Marks of Genuineness. It is not some Staple Common Place, as most of those forged by

But to return to Mr. J. he charges (p. 38.) Mr. W. and the Author of the *Inquiry*, with setting *Plato's Hand and Seal to a forged Letter*. But was he then so wretchedly ignorant, as not to know that *Eusebius* and *Theodorit* cite this very Letter, as well as they? That the learned *Bentley* had already cleared it from all the little Cavils which he has brought against it?

As to the Charge of *setting the Hand of Writers to forged Books*; were it worth while to retort it on himself, one might do it in the most effectual and unanswerable Manner. He insists much on the Authority of *Andronicus Rhodius*; and for this appeals to what he calls his *Paraphrase on Aristotle's Ethics*. And did then our learned old *Critic* think that this was really the Work of *Andronicus*? Dr. *Bentley*, speaking of this very Piece, declares, "that the old MS. it-

" the Sophists are; but a Letter of Busines, circumstantiated
" with great Variety of Things and Persons, all apt and
" proper to the Writer and the Date. It was forged there-
" fore by no Body," &c. *Bentley's Remarks*, 39, 40.

Yes; but Mr. J. insists that it does not abound with *private* and *arcane* Doctrines, or *serious* and ethical Discourses, p. 36. And who, let me ask him, ever said, it did? It was only produced to shew, that *Plato* did not always deliver his real Opinion in his Letters; and does it not prove this in the most plain and undeniable Manner?

As to what he says of the *Symbols* which *Plato* is supposed to have annexed to his Letters; I must refer him for a full and effectual Confutation of all he has advanced on this Point, to *Remarks on a Discourse of Free thinking*, P. ii. p. 40, 41.

" self

" self has no Name of any Author; that
 " *Dan. Heinsius*, the first Editor of it, in-
 " forms us, that *Andronicus*'s Name was
 " prefixed to it by a *modern and a very un-*
 " *learned Hand* ". But I hardly know
 whether I should urge Mr. J. with this
 Testimony, since to a Writer of his Taste,
 the Pleasure of asserting these false and

ⁿ *Dissertation on Phalaris*, p. 331. Paraphrasis quam sine
 nomine auctoris primum Lugd. Bat. 1607. 4to. deinde sub
Andronici Rhodii nomine, edidit cum Latina sua versione *Dan. Heinsius* 1617. 8vo. recusam Cantabrigiae 1679. 8vo. quam
 quam antiquissimi illius Andronici, de quo infra in Peripate-
 ticus dicam, non esse, docet Salmasius ad Simplicium p. 227.
 — In Bibliotheca Cœsarea occurrit sine nomine auctoris,
 teste Nesselio, 4. p. 7. et Heinsius affirmat Andronici Rhodii
 nomen in codice suo adscriptum fuisse a manu recentiore at-
 que indecta. Fabric. Bib. Gr. L. III. p. 150, 151.

But to inhance and inflame the Charge, we are told,
 that the Author of the *Inq.* is not only guilty of Forgery
 and Corruption with respect to *Plato*, but has likewise set
 Mr. J's. *Hand to what he never wrote*, p. 47. and for this
 the Gentleman appeals to a Passage in the *Inq.* in which
 it is said " that he undertook to demonstrate that the Phi-
 " losophers believed a Future State." — Now, in the Title
 Page of his *first* Pamphlet we have these Words, " The
 " Doctrine of the ancient Philosophers, concerning a Fu-
 " ture State, shewn to be consistent with Reason, and their
 " Belief of it demonstrated. By John Jackson," &c. It is
 plain then that his Name has actually been put to the Pro-
 position abovementioned ; the only Quellion is, whether it
 was put there by the Author of the *Inq.* or himself. Mr. J.
 affirms that it was set there by the *first*, and does he expect
 after this that we ever should appeal to his Candour and In-
 genuity again ? Or that his Complaints of *Misrepresentation*,
Calumny, &c. should be considered as any Thing more than
 the constant Refuge of a baffled Zealot ? Had he written on
 purpose to confirm the Character already given of your
common Answerers, or to prove that *his own* Assertions de-
 serve no Credit, how could he have done it more effectually
 than by thus openly disclaiming *his own Hand* ?

groundless Stories, is more than an Equivalent to the Shame of being told of it.

II.

It had been asserted that *Stobæus*, *Apuleius*, and *Justin Martyr* were not so competent and able Judges with regard to the Authenticity of ancient Books, as some of our later Critics^o. But Mr. J. rather than want Matter for Dispute, will deny even this^p.

As for *Apuleius*; I would ask what Proof he has any where given of his Critical Abilities; or what Writings of his of this Kind Mr. J. will oppose to those of *Salmasius*, the two *Scaligers*, *J. Casaubon*, &c. ? It is generally supposed that he translated the *Asclepian Dialogue*, and believed it to be wrote by *Hermes*. And is not this a notable Proof of his Critical Acumen ?

With regard to *Stobæus* and *Justin Martyr*; I may refer the whole Debate to a Question of plain Fact. As to the Books, which go under the Name of *Hermes Trismegistus*, they both suppose them to be really genuine, and written by the Man whose Name they bear. However they have been disclaimed as *spurious* by *J. Casaubon*; and this, I think, has been the general and standing Opinion

^o *Crit. Inq.* pag. 14, 15. ^p *Treatise, &c.* pag. 31, 32,
33, 34.

of the learned World ever since. Will then Mr. J. say that these two Ancients were better Judges in the present Case than any modern Critics? If he will, it lies upon him to vindicate the Credit, and assert the real Genuineness and Authenticity of the Books abovementioned. If he will not say this, he gives up the very Point he has been all along asserting; or, in other Words, allows that the Judgment of these Ancients was far inferior to that of our modern Critics with regard to the particular Point we are here debating.

The Gentleman, with his usual Gravity, informs us, that *Stobæus had read whole Libraries of Greek Books*, pag. 31. But what is this to his critical Acumen? Or how does it prove against plain Fact that he was not imposed upon by forged Writings, which have been actually detected by the Sagacity and Acuteness of our modern Critics?

To give one Instance more, he inserts in his Collections several Extracts from the Epistles given to *Phalaris* and *Xenophon*. And here again, to what an unhappy Dilemma is Mr. J. reduced, as he must either insist that these Pieces were not spurious; or allow that his favourite *Stobæus* had not the same critical Talents, as a late celebrated Writer of our own?

With respect to *Justin*, tis shrewdly observed,

served, That he is one of the *oldest Christian Writers*, p. 31. And is it then possible that this Circumstance should be seriously alledged as a Proof, that *Justin* was an able Critic, and well qualifed to distinguish what Books were true and genuine, and what were false and spurious? Whatever might be the real Excellencies of the *old Christian Writers*, I humbly conceive, a critical Acumen must not be reckoned one of them. What a Number of Books was generally received in the first Ages of the Church, which are now universally allowed to be false and spurious? how usual is it with *the most learned of the Fathers*, to cite Books with Approbation and Esteem, which are now considered by all Men of Sense as mere Forgeries? What must we think of their *critical Acumen*, when so clumsy a Cheat as *Aristea's Story of the Septuagint* was eagerly received by them? To which I may add Books or Oracles falsely ascribed to the ancient Sibyl, to *Hermes Trismegistus*, *Hydaspes*, with many Pieces publish'd under the Names of the Writers of the New Testament, and others who flourished in the primitive Times. It would be endless to recount the numerous Forgeries both with respect to sacred and profane Antiquity, which, gross and bungling as they were, imposed on *the ablest, the most learned, and the most critical of the Fathers*. And what better Proof can

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can be demanded of the low State of Criticism
in these Ages?

I am at a Loss to understand what should move Mr. J. to insist so much upon an Argument, which will oblige us to receive so many, as well as so gross and palpable Impostures. Is it with a View to make Repri-sals on Father *Harduin*, and restore these Pieces in lieu of those, of which the Jesuit has endeavour'd to deprive us? and surely one Scheme is just as reasonable and well grounded as the other. For what can one say better of either, than that 'tis *the mere Delirium of a doting Critic*?

It had been said, that *Justin* was a *pious Christian Martyr*⁴. But this, as Mr. J. would suggest, was too cold and invidious a Compliment; it did not, it seems, come up to the real Merit of the Man, who was an excellent *Critic*, as well as a *pious Christian*. Observe now the Shrewdness and Consistency of this Remark; the very Supposition which makes him an *able Critic*, would in reality prove, he could not be an honest Man. It appears from his Writings, that it was his Custom to cite Books which were really false and spurious. If therefore he had such an *exquisite Skill in Critic*, as is here supposed, he must have actually seen through the Forgery and Cheat of these very Pieces. And

⁴ *Critical Enquiry*, p. 15.

if

if so, what shall we say as to the Integrity of his Conduct, or how shall we absolve him from the Charge of plain and downright Knavery?

But what a strange Zealot in the Cause of Criticism have I here to do with, since he chuses to give up the very Probity and Honesty of the Men he most admires, rather than admit the least Insufficiency and Defect with regard to their critical Abilities?

But 'tis Time to open and explain the Circumstance, which gave rise to this part of the Controversy. Mr. J. had cited a Passage from the Book *De Mundo*, in order to demonstrate that Aristotle believed a future State. Now here it was asked, why did he produce but *one* Passage, and that from a Book whose Credit had been long question'd, and disputed in the learned World? As he professed to deal in *Demonstration*, why did he not appeal to some Work, which was *universally allowed* to belong to Aristotle; and this surely will seem no unreasonable Demand, if we reflect, that so considerable a Number of his real and unquestion'd Writings is still extant.

But here the Author of the *Inquiry* did not assert, that the Book is actually false and spurious; 'tis enough for him, that tis *doubtful*

¹ By Proclus, the two Scaligers, J. Casaubon, Salmasius, Dan. Heinicus, Gassendi, Victorius, &c.

and

and uncertain, whether it was written by *Aristotle*. For how can you *demonstrate*, on the Authority of such a *Book*, that he believ'd a future State? Or how on this Supposition, could Mr. *J.* quote it, as containing the very Words of *Aristotle*?

If he would make it answer his Purpose, he must shew, that 'tis really and undoubt-edly the Work of *Aristotle*; that 'tis as *uni-versally* allowed to belong to him, as any of his other Pieces.

And how does he do this? why, “*De-metrius, Stobæus, Justin, Apulejus, sup-pose it to be genuine.*” But the Point to be proved was, that it has been *universally* received as the Work of *Aristotle*; that it stands on the same Footing, in the Opinion of the learned World, with his other Writ-tings; and how is it possible to prove this, when *Proclus*, a learned Ancient, speaks of it with Diffidence and Doubt; and so many Moderns reject it, as actually false and spu-rious?

But Mr. *J.* seems to fancy, that the Au-thority of *Demetrius* must needs be admitted as decisive in the present Case: But does he not know that Critics of the first Rank, have suspected another Book too not to be-long to *Aristotle*, notwithstanding this very *Demetrius* cited it as his? And does not this

^a *Plutarch, Bentley*; vid. *Dissertation on Socrates's Epist.* i. 13.

plainly shew, that in their Opinion, the Authority of *Demetrius* cannot be admitted as decisive in Cases of this Nature; and what has the Author of the *Inquiry* said more?

But why did he in his Reply to this part of the Argument, take no Notice of *Demetrius*, as well as *Stobæus*, &c. The Case was this; Mr. J. had represented them all as very considerable and extraordinary Critics. If therefore it could be shewn that any one of the *four* was unworthy of this Character, this was sufficient to expose the Vanity and Emptiness of his Assertion; and could it be shewn to be true of *three*, this would bear harder upon him still.

If the Author of the *Inquiry* did not put *Demetrius* on the same footing with the rest, 'twas only because he thought him a far abler Critic than any of the other three. However, what has been said above, may serve to shew that his bare Authority is not sufficient to fix and determine the Point in question.

Had the Writer just mentioned, undertaken to shew that the Piece was really false and spurious; it would have been his Business to discuss this Point in a more particular and exact manner; to examine how far the Reasons assigned by our modern Critics might serve to ballance and supersede the Arguments and Authorities produced on the other Side.

Side. But 'twas not his Busines to determine on which Side the Probability lies; 'tis enough, that the Point is yet undecided, and the Book not universally, or even generally allow'd, to belong to *Aristotle*. I will just observe, that, notwithstanding the Authority of *Demetrius*, the Reasons affsigned by *Heinsius*, are supposed, by a very candid and learned Writer, to be unanswerable ^t.

It was said that *Improvements had been made in the Art of Criticism in these latter Ages*. And why will not Mr. *J.* allow that Improvements have been made in this Branch of Knowledge, as well as others? If not, whence comes it that so many Errors of the best

^t *Menagius*, speaking of this Book, says, Certe Aristotelis non esse constat; quod multis atque invictissimis argumentis ostendit vir politioris literaturæ Dan. Hensius in oratione huic rei destinata. In Diog. Laer. 7, 152.

And after all, what mighty Reflexion is it on *Demetrius*, to suppose that he might take a Work for *Aristotle's*, which really was not his? Were not many Books, father'd upon *Aristotle*, received as genuine by the learned World at that very Time? (*Vid. Ammonius's Comment on Aristotle's Categories.*) Must you not allow that *Demetrius* himself was deceived as to a Fact mentioned in the Piece of *Nobility*, whether the Book be genuine or not? (*Bentley, on Socrates's Epistles*, i. 13.) Did not *Heraclides of Pontus* quote a Tragedy as *Sophocles's*, which really was not his? (*Laertius* 5, 92.) and how can the Authority of a single Writer be admitted as decisive in Cases of this Nature, when *Pindar* asserts, that the Poem called *Cypria*, was actually written by *Homer*. (*Ælian Var. Hist.* 9, 15.) *Herodotus* affirms that it was not, (2.) and others assign it to another Author.

ancient Critics have been corrected by our modern Writers ?

Have not the last proved many Parts of History to be intirely false and groundless, which passed with the first for real and unquestioned Truths ^v. And does not this necessarily imply a superior Knowledge in the Art of Criticism ?

But I need not go so high as some of the Authors mentioned in the last Note. It is evident that the *later Ages* in the *Inquiry* are opposed to the Times of *Stobæus*, *Apuleius*, *Justin*, and the Ages which succeeded them. And here let me ask, do not *Plutarch*, *Pollux*, *Laertius*, with many others, assign Books to ancient Authors, which do not actually belong to them ? And whence do we know that they do not actually belong to them, but from the Discoveries of our modern Critics ?

As to the *Christian* Writers ; I have said that forged and spurious Books are often quoted by the *most learned of the Fathers* ?

^v It would be endless to point out Particulars ; nor will the learned Reader think it necessary : As for Mr. J. I must refer him for the Fact here asserted to the Writings of *Erasmus*, the two *Scaligers*, *I. Casaubon*, *Bentley*, &c. In these he will find that the Writers referred to in the Page above, were some of the first Names in the ancient World, *Hermippus*, *Callisthenes*, *Demetrius Phalereus*, *Aristoxenus*, *Diodorus Siculus*, *Livy*, *Plutarch*, *Quintilian*, &c. &c.

For are not *Justin, Clemens of Alexandria, Lactantius, Austin, Eusebius, and Theodoret* to be ranked in this Class? And will Mr. J. himself deny that they were all imposed upon by Forgeries, too gross and palpable to escape the Sagacity of our modern Critics? And indeed, from what Swarms of Forgeries and Cheats have we been freed by their Acuteness in these two last Ages? And yet they were under great Disadvantages by the Loss of many ancient Monuments: However, if with fewer *Helps* they could detect those Impostures of Antiquity, which Antiquity itself did not call in Question; to what can we truly ascribe the Difference, but to the *superior State and Condition of the Art itself in these later Ages?*

It may be asked by what Means, or in Consequence of what Advantages, the Moderns have been enabled to make these Discoveries? I have not Time to point out here the several Particulars, and therefore must confine myself to one or two. Now they had great Advantages, as they understood the *Philosophy of Language*, a Thing little studied, or attended to by the Ancients. They were too, far abler Chronologists, and had a better and more correct Logic, to aid and assist them in the Art of Reasoning. And are not these Advantages more particularly requisite, in order to qualify Men

to shine and excel in this Branch of Criticism ?

But 'tis needless to inlarge on these Points ; Should we allow Mr. J. the very thing which he contends for, viz. That the Piece *De Mundo* was written by *Aristotle*, yet the Passage produced from it will make nothing to the Matter in Hand. It is taken from *Plato* ; and *Plato* employs it to prove that a Providence was really and actually administer'd in this World. *De Leg.* iv. p. 600. *Ficin.* Ed. *Atticus* too, an old *Platonist*, uses it to the same Purpose. *Eusebius Præp. Ev.* xv. 5. and how does it appear that it was produced with any other view in the Piece *de Mundo* ?

What Force then can this Passage be supposed to have, as it is *doubtful*, whether the Book was written by *Aristotle* ; and *doubtful* too whether the Passage relates to another Life ?

III.

Mr. J. flourishes much on a Distinction which he had made before, viz. that in the Opinion of the old Philosophers, the sensitive or animal Soul only was to die and perish with the Body, while the rational was to survive, and continue in a State of Rewards and Punishments, according to the Merit or Demerit of its Actions in the present Life ^{w.}.

^{w.} *Treatise, &c.* p. 34.

He every where represents and extols this as a wonderful Discovery ; boasts that it quite *dumb-founds* his Adversary, and makes him *half-mad*. As if the Author last mentioned had not given a particular, and distinct Reply, in which he shews that all this makes nothing against him in the present Argument ^x.

But to consider it once once more, as to the Followers of *Pythagoras*, several of them held that the Soul was mortal, and would die and perish with the Body ^y. To see then the Use and Excellence of this Distinction, let us apply it to the present case. If Mr. J. would bring it home to the Purpose, he must say, that, according to these Philosophers, the sensitive Soul only was to be extinguish'd and dissolved at Death. But here he should reflect that some of these very Men entertained the same Notion of the Soul with *Democritus* and *Leucippus* ^z. And did *Democritus* and *Leucippus* hold that the Animal Soul only was mortal ?

However the general Doctrine of the *Pythagoreans* was, that the Soul was to survive the Body, and remain a separate and distinct Being for a certain Period. The thing af-

^x *Crit. Inq.* p. 27. 37, 38. ^y *Crit. Inq.* p. 12.
* *Ibid.*

serted by the Author of the *D. L.* is, that during this Period it was supposed to migrate from one Body to another by a necessity merely physical. And what now becomes of the Distinction above mentioned? All Mr. *J.* can infer from it, is, that the rational or intelligent Soul was to subsist in a Future State. And is not this the very thing affirmed by his Adversary? Does not the last build his Doctrine of the physical Migrations on this very Supposition?

Had the Question been, whether the Soul, according to these Philosophers, was to subsist in a Future State, this Distinction might indeed have served our Author's Purpose. But as things now stand, what can it serve to shew more, than that Mr. *J.* either wilfully misrepresents, or does not really understand the Point in Dispute?

Let us go next to *Plato*. The Point for which the Author of the *D. L.* contends, is, that he not only believed the future Existence of the Soul, but that he likewise assigned it this Existence in a State of Happiness or Misery, which were imagined to arise from the very Nature and Constitution of Things. And to what Purpose does Mr. *J.* urge his Distinction in this Case: It at best but proves that the intelligent Soul was to subsist in a Future State. And does not the Author of the

D. L.

D. L. go upon this very Principle? It is so far from making against him, that were it not strictly and exactly true, his whole reasoning must of Course fall to the Ground^a.

Let us examine next what Force this Distinction may have with regard to *Aristotle*. What Mr. W. takes upon him to affirm, is, that, according to this Philosopher, the Soul, upon its Separation from the Body, was to be resolved into the universal Substance, or God; and that this Refusion was supposed to take away and destroy all personal and distinct Existence. To what Purpose now is it to distinguish between the rational and sensitive Soul, and insist that the first was not to be

^a But though Mr. J. does not attempt to confute, or even contradict his Adversary on this Article, yet I must take Notice, that he both contradicts and confutes himself in the most plain and open Manner. In his *Farther Defence*, p. 29. he observes, "That the *Platonist*s distinguished between the *sen-sitive and intelligent Soul*: That the first was held to be ma-
terial, and supposed to die with the Body." However in his last Piece he assures us, that *Plato* gave and assigned the *sensi-tive or animal Soul* the very same Immortality with the *ra-tional or intelligent*, p. 33. "Plato, not conceiving the *Mind* or intelligent Soul, to exist without a Soul as its Vehicle, in which it resided, made in consequence this Soul to be immor-tal." Again, "Plato thought the Soul inseparable from the Mind, and therefore immortal." p. 34.

It would be needless to enter farther upon this Point, as it is impossible to know, to which of these two *contrary Declarations* Mr. J. will chuse to stick. And, what is worse still, one cannot be certain that he will not deny in his next Piece that he did ever assert either of them.

extinguish'd and dissolved at Death? For is not this the very Thing affirmed by the Author of the *D. L.* when he asserts that the Soul upon Death was to be resolved into the divine Substance^b?

With regard to the Stoics, Mr. J. himself contends, that, on their Principles, the

^b As for the Followers of Aristotle, it has been proved that several of them conceived the rational Soul it self to be nothing more than a mere Quality, which was to die and perish with the Body. *Crit. Inq.* p. 22.

If others held that it would survive, yet with their Master they resolved it into the universal Substance, or God.

As Mr. J. had laid so great Stress on the Testimony of Justin, had represented him as so exquisitely well skilled in the Writings and Principles of Aristotle, his Adversary took Occasion from hence to employ an Argument *ad hominem*, and observed, that according to the Martyr, Aristotle held the Mortality of the Soul. (*Crit. Inq.* p. 15.) To this it is replied, that Justin speaks only of the sensitive Soul, *Treatise*, p. 33, 34. Mr. J. may, if he pleases, believe this, or affirm it without believing. But as to Justin's real meaning, it appears from his own Words, that he speaks of the very Soul, which Plato supposed to be a self or eternal moving Substance; (*O μὲν ἐλάττων αἰνίγμα τὸν εἶναι νόητον,*) that very Soul, whose Immortality Cicero undertakes to explain and support on the Arguments and Authority of Plato, in his first *Tusculan*, and other Places. And was this the sensitive and animal Soul only?

I will just add, that Justin here speaks of the Soul which Aristotle called *νοῦς*; and this was the very Term which he applied to the rational and intelligent Soul, if we may believe Cicero, *in Tusc.* 10.

I must observe, that I am here urging a mere Argument *ad hominem*; and that the Dispute does not turn on the Truth of what Justin here says, but on the single Point whether he says it or no.

Soul after Death was to return to the Elements, from which it was originally taken. And has not his Adversary, by plain and undeniable Testimonies, shewn, that, in Consequence of this Return, it was supposed, to lose its personal and distinct Existence, pag. 129. To what Purpose then serves his notable Distinction in the present Case, as both he and the Author of the *Inq.* speak of *the very same Soul*?

Upon the whole, of what Significancy is this Distinction, which tends only to prove the bare Subsistence of the Soul after Death; a Thing which never was denied? Do even the *Spinozists* themselves hold, that the Substance of the Soul is to be annihilated and reduced to nothing at Death? If Mr. *J.* would come to the Point, let him attempt to shew that it was to live in a State of Future Happiness or Misery, appointed by God as a proper Reward or Punishment.

IV.

Mr. *J.* charges his Adversary with Terciversation^c for laying in one Place, that the State of *Future Happiness in Heaven*, taught and inculcated by the old Philosophers, was a *Fiction of their own*, p. 53; and yet af-

^c *Treatise, &c.* p. 19. ^d *First Dispute,* p. 6.

firming that it was a Fiction of the *more early Lawgivers*, p. 79. But had the Gentleman attended to the Title of the fourth Chapter^d, to the plain and express Declarations made by the Author of the *Inquiry*, p. 78, 79^e; he must have seen that what is advanced in the last Place, relates only to future Punishments, or to the popular Account of the infernal Torments. And what is this to the State of *Happiness in Heaven*, which was assigned only to a few Choice and select Spirits, and not to the Body of good Men in general? What Shadow of a Contradiction, or what Colour for the Charge of Tergiversation, when the two Places belong to two such very different and distinct Subjects?

It had been asserted, that the old Inhabitants of *Italy*, who lived before the building of *Rome*, were a *rude and barbarous People*. Mr. J. takes upon him to disprove this; and how? "Jerome says, they were plain "unpolished Men, but he owns they were

^d That the Philosophers did not believe a future State of Punishments.

^e I must put the Reader in mind, that the several Arguments explained in this Chapter, relate only to the Doctrine of future Punishments. p. 78.

He, (Mr. J.) was forced to represent the *popular Notions of future Punishments* found in the Writings of the later Greek Philosophers, as *their own*: Though invented by the early Lawgivers. p. 79.

" *Men of Letters*, and could both write and
" read ; who, before the Use of Paper and
" Parchments, wrote their Letters on squared
" Pieces of Wood, or Bark of Trees ?"

They were *Men of Letters*. How does he shew this ? Why they could both write and read. Again, " Before the Use of Paper they wrote their Letters on the Bark of Trees ." And is not this a notable Proof that they were not a *rude and barbarous People* ?

But as he pretends to give the Passage from *Jerom*, as cited in the *Inquiry*^g, why did he suppress the following Words ? *Apud quos erat cruda rusticitas, & qui humanitatem quodam modo nesciebant.* Now could any Writer, but himself, appeal to this Letter for a Proof, that these were not a *barbarous and rude People* ?

Well ; but they were *great Genius's* ; Men of exalted Understandings, and actually believed a Future State. That they believed a Future State, I shall readily allow ; but their Account of it does not, I apprehend, prove that they were *great Genius's*, or endowed with *uncommon and extraordinary Understandings*, as Mr. J. thought proper to assert. For on what Foundation did they build it ? Why,
" They concluded from *nocturnal Visions* of

"dead Persons that they still had Life^b." And is it likely, that *Cicero* would be much influenced by such Arguments and Authorities as these?

Page 27, Mr. *J.* affirms, that the Philosophers did not suppose the *Anima Mundi* to be a real and proper God. But why does he make no Reply to what has been alledged, in Support of the contrary Opinion from *Varro*, *Virgil*, and *Himself*? (*Crit. Inquiry*, p. 188, 189.) Why does he take no Notice of the several Testimonies produced c. vii, viii. in which the Divinity of the *Anima Mundi* is inculcated, in the most plain and express Terms?—Or would he after all take Refuge in the Distinction of some learned Men, who imagine, that the Philosophers held two Souls of the World? On this very Supposition it would be easy to confute all he has advanced, and add fresh Light and Force to the general Argument of the *Critical Inquiry*.

It was said, that *Synesius* supposed the Soul to be *uncreated*. Mr. *J.* replies, "That he only supposed it to exist before the Body." ⁱ But has it not been shewn, that the Philosophers, who gave the Soul this previous Existence, held it to be eternal *a parte ante*? and that they assigned it this eternal Existence, purely because it was a Part of God^k;

^c *Tearise*, p. 7. ⁱ p. 26, 27. ^b *Crit. Inquiry*, c. 7, 8.
and

and were they gross enough to suppose that a Part of God was a created Substance ?

To shew that the Charge on the ancient Sages is fair and just, I will appeal to Mr. J's. own Words. " There were Christian Writers, who thought the human Soul to be " of the same Nature and Substance with God. " And they took that Notion from the Doctrine " of the Pagan Philosophers." Farther Defence, p. 8. If now these Philosophers supposed the Soul to be of the same Nature and Substance with God ; did they not suppose it too to be eternal *a parte ante* and uncreated ? or did they imagine the very Nature and Substance of God himself, to have had a temporary Production, and beginning of Existence ?

He may too, if he pleases, take this as a Proof that *Plato* held the Soul to be *ungenerated*; it were easy to shew this from the plain and express Words of the Philosopher himself: It has already been proved on the Authority of very considerable Writers¹. But I chuse to refer Mr. J. to this Passage of his own, as it is appealing to the single Authority, which he ever imagines may deserve his Notice.

I will only add, that in this very Passage he gives up one of the principal and most important Points in the present Controversy ; and that before he gets to the End of his

¹ Critical Inquiry, c. 7. ?

Preface. For does he not here contend, that, in the Opinion of the old Philosophers, the Soul was supposed to be of the same Nature and Substance with God? However, I must do him the Justice to observe, that though this be one of the main and principal Points asserted in his Preface, yet in the Body of his Pamphlet he takes great Pains to confute and overthrow it.

But to conclude. I shall make no Apology for not considering every Cavil advanced in the Pamphlet I have been examining : If I need make an Apology, 'tis only for considering so much of it ; for dwelling so long on little Points, which do not affect the main Question : but how could I help it, as Mr. J. would neither undertake to justify his own Quotations, nor attempt any Objections to the most material ones, produced against him ? As to the real Motive, which determined him to act in this manner ; whether 'twas because his Antagonist deserved no Answer, or that he found himself unable to give a good one, must be submitted to the Judgment of the Reader.

The Arguments, advanced in the Piece I am here examining, have all along been considered, as Mr. J's own ; and surely, there is nothing unfair and disingenuous in this.

this. Most of them are nothing more than bare Repetitions of what he himself has already asserted in the present Controversy—and as for the rest, they are surely the best that can be alledged in his Defence ; and yet what Adversary could wish to be attacked by worse ? However, if the Gentleman, in order to retrieve his Character, will endeavour to strike out any thing more plausible and specious, and venture even *now* (I mean in the Publication of a *fourth or fifth Pamphlet,*) to engage to the Bottom of the Question, and come to the real Merits of the Cause, he may possibly hear farther from me.

F I N I S.

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